Development of methods and information to support the assessment of economic performance in Commonwealth fisheries
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8 Case study: the eastern tuna and billfish fishery
Overview of the eastern tuna and billfish fishery
The eastern tuna and billfish fishery is a complex fishery system involving multiple species and fishing methods. There is also a significant recreational sector targeting the same stocks. The commercial fishery includes longline and minor line fishing methods; and the non-longline sector, which uses purse seine and pole fishing methods.

The eastern tuna and billfish fishery extends along Australia’s entire eastern seaboard from the tip of Cape York to the southern most point of the Australian Fishing Zone. It includes Commonwealth waters off Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania out to the 200 nautical mile limit of the Australian Fishing Zone and includes waters around Norfolk Island (map 3). The fishery has been commercially exploited since the early 1950s when the Japanese began pelagic longlining off the east coast of Australia. Major ports used by the fleet include Cairns, Mooloolaba, Coffs Harbour and Hobart (AFMA 2008c). In 2006-07 the gross value of production (GVP) of the entire fishery was around $32 million, of which the longline sector accounted for over 99 per cent (ABARE 2008a).

Australian longline and minor line fishers catch over seventy species of fish in the eastern tuna and billfish fishery. However, the principal catches are yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares), bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus), broadbill swordfish (Xiphias gladius), albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), and skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) (Larcombe and McLoughlin 2007). In 2005-06 these species accounted for 80 per cent of the total gross value of production of the fishery (ABARE 2008a). Many other species are caught as byproducts, such as striped marlin, pelagic sharks, longtail tuna, rudder fish, black oilfish, dolpinfish, rays bream, moonfish and wahoo. Incidental catches of blue and black marlin occur, but these must be returned to the sea under a legislative amendment that came into effect in July 1998, in recognition that these species are the key target species of the game fishing sector.

Tuna and billfish are highly migratory species. The link between fish caught in Australian waters and the large stocks of the central and western Pacific is poorly understood, and is the subject of ongoing research because of its obvious management implications. Approximately, 2 million tonnes of tuna are taken annually in the central and western Pacific Ocean. International stock assessment advice indicates that these levels are generally sustainable, although concern is beginning to emerge about the status of bigeye and yellowfin tuna stocks.

Overall, ETBF catches show high inter-annual variability. It is thought that catch variability is influenced by oceanographic factors (eg. El Niño), which influences the migration of tuna to and within the fishery, particularly as the southern half of the AFZ is at the extreme migration range for many of these species.

Commercial fishing for major tuna and billfish species in the ETBF is regulated by the Commonwealth government through the Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery Management Plan 2005, which was adopted in October 2005. Under the plan, annual fishing permits are to be replaced by statutory fishing rights (SFRs) (AFMA 2005). Longline SFRs will restrict the number of branchline clips (hooks) available to operators using longline methods on a yearly basis and minor line SFRs will define the maximum number of lines that may be used at any one time by minor line operators. Operators in both sectors will also need an additional permit to operate in the Coral Sea Zone, formerly referred to as Zone E. All other management zones in the fishery have been removed under the new management plan.

Until SFRs are granted, the fishery continues to be managed by annual fishing permits (through transitional arrangements under the Management Plan). Species specific arrangements are also in place for operators targeting southern bluefin tuna, broadbill swordfish and albacore.

During the 1990s the ETBF expanded rapidly, particularly in northern Queensland waters where catch rates of yellowfin and bigeye were high. In late 1997, many longliners began to fish out of southern Queensland ports, such as Mooloolaba, to target both bigeye tuna for sashimi markets and swordfish for markets in the United States (AFMA 2004a).

Effort in the ETBF increased steadily throughout the 1990s before peaking at 12.7 million hooks in 2002-03. Since then effort has decreased significantly to 8.9 million hooks in 2006-07 (figure n and table 11). The number of active vessels had also decreased from around 143 in 2001-02 to 113 vessels in 2004-05 and 71 vessels in 2006-07.

In contrast, average effort per vessel has increased sharply (figure n) from 90 thousand hooks in 2001-02 to 101 thousand hooks in 2005-06 and 125 thousand hooks in 2006-07. The number of hooks per set has also increased, from around 900 hooks per set during in 1998-99 to 2001-02 to around 1,200 hooks in 2006-07 (computed from AFMA 2008d and Campbell 2007).

Catches of yellowfin, bigeye and broadbill swordfish are shown in figure o. Swordfish catches grew strongly until 2001-02 when they peaked at 3129 tonnes before falling to 1633 tonnes in 2006-07. Similarly, catches of yellowfin peaked at 3394 tonnes in 2002-03, fell to 1385 tonnes in 2005-06 before recovering slightly to 1800 tonnes in 2006-07. In contrast, catches of albacore have increased from 632 tonnes in 2004-05 to 2814 tonnes in 2006-07 (ABARE 2008a).

In line with the trend in catch, the gross value of production (in 2006-07 dollars) for the fishery declined from $78 million dollars in 2001-02 to $28 million dollars in 2005-06 and back to about $32 million dollars in 2006-07 (with a significant contribution from the albacore fishery). The GVP of the major species, including yellowfin, bigeye and billfish, has all fallen dramatically in recent years (figure p).

The harvest and gross value of production of albacore has increased substantially in recent years and is shown in figure q. In 2006-07 albacore accounted for around 18 per cent of the total gross value of production of the fishery.
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MAP 3 – Area of the eastern tuna and billfish fishery
11 Effort statistics of the eastern tuna and billfish fishery
year
hooks
sets
hooks per set
active vessels
millions
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1986/87
0.29
760
377
62
1987/88
1.07
1 618
664
68
1988/89
1.09
2 099
520
94
1989/90
0.79
2 300
345
98
1990/91
1.56
2 864
543
101
1991/92
1.76
3 252
541
109
1992/93
1.86
2 975
625
91
1993/94
2.38
3 664
650
79
1994/95
3.37
4 509
747
98
1995/96
3.98
5 552
717
112
1996/97
5.33
7 645
698
123
1997/98
7.53
9 270
812
150
1998/99
9.91
10 762
921
156
1999/00
9.86
11 070
891
147
2000/01
10.09
11 529
875
136
2001/02
11.8
12 874
916
143
2002/03
12.69
13 535
938
140
2003/04
11.11
11 766
945
131
2004/05
9.37
9 869
950
113
2005/06
9.33
8 976
1 039
92
2006/07
8.9
7 315
1 217
71
Source: AFMA (2008d).
Profit decomposition and productivity in the eastern tuna and billfish fishery
Individual prices per species per vessel are not available for the fishery. Consequently, the vessel output price is defined as the total value of landings of fish divided by the total weight of the fish landed. This data limitation prevents relative profit contributions of the different fish species being assessed, but allows the overall effect of fish returns on individual and industry performance to be assessed. Profit decompositions can also be used to assess the contribution of harvests to relative profits.

Profit is defined as net gain from fishing activity, which equals total boat cash income minus capital cost (repairs and maintenance), labour cost and material costs. Net gain from fishing in this report is different than boat cash profit in Vieira et al. (2007). The differences are in terms of measured labour costs, repairs and maintenance costs and material costs. In Vieira et al. (2007) cash costs include administration, bait, crew costs, freight and marketing expenses, fuel, insurance, interest paid, license fees and levies, packaging, repairs and maintenance and other costs. Labour cost (usually the highest cash cost) includes wages and an estimated value for owner and partner, family and unpaid labour.

In terms of total revenue, vessel owners assert that total income before packaging, recorded in the ABARE surveys, is lower than the true income (ETBF RAG meeting, 14-15 July 2007). Without taking into account income after packaging, many vessels may show false losses. In addition, labour cost in ABARE surveys may reflect share payments in profits. The ‘true’ labour costs for crew may thus be lower.

Fishing effort is measured as number of hooks (AFMA logbook data 2007). For the longline fisheries in the Western Central Pacific Ocean, the fishing cost is usually measured by dollars per hook (Kompas and Che 2006). For the ETBF study, the fishing cost and the labour cost per hook is not available, therefore it is estimated based on total effort (number of hooks) (AFMA logbook data 2007), average hooks per fishing day (Campbell 2007), average number of crew on board (ABARE survey data), and average wage per day for agriculture and fishing (DOL 2008).

The number of fishing days is computed by dividing total effort (number of hooks) by average hooks per day. The labour quantity is defined as the multiplication of the average number of crew on board (ABARE survey data) and fishing days (defined by dividing total number of hooks by average hooks set per day). To calibrate, a time series for wage labour is also computed from the average wage per day for agriculture and fishing during 2000-2005 (DOL 2008).

Since fuel is the most important material in fishing costs, a fuel price index is used as a proxy for the material price index. The fuel price index is computed from the average diesel price from ABARE (2008b). The quantity of fuel is computed by dividing fuel and gear costs (surveyed at boat level) by fuel price. Capital cost is measured as a sum of the repair costs and maintenance and a charge for the opportunity cost of capital (6 per cent per year).
Estimated results and profit, productivity analysis
The relevant decomposition takes the form (see section 5 above):
equation
so that the performance of vessel a relative to vessel b can be decomposed into differences because of productivity (Ra,b ), output (POa,b ), variable inputs (PLa,b and PFa,b ) and vessel fishing power (Ka,b ). In constructing the index in (8.1) PLa,b and PFa,b are treated as negative outputs. In this study vessel fishing power is measured as total number of hooks.

For comparative purposes, a reference firm (a) must be chosen. Using a benchmark that is an observed firm or vessel helps fishers to better assess those factors that are constraining profits under their control (such as productivity) from factors that are not (such as fuel prices). The reference vessel is the arithmetic average vessel in 1999. In 1999, profit and capital were high and stable and during that year the average TFP was also highest. All value variables are in 2004-05 prices. The profit decompositions are presented in table 12 for the years 1989-90 to 2004-05.

During 1989-90 to 2002-03 the stock component of the productivity decomposition shows that the contribution of the fish stock to profit in the ETBF has been falling steadily since 1990. However, the profit index had increased during this time because of higher output prices and a larger contribution from vessel capital to profits. During 2000-02, higher output prices contributed relatively more to profit relative to the reference year (1999), as did higher productivity and additional capital investment. However, during that period higher fuel costs had a negative impact on profits. Note: all values are in 2004-05 prices.

The profit level in 2002-03 decreased dramatically from an index value of more than 2 in the previous four years (1998-99 to 2001-02) to 1.62. However, in 2003-04 and 2004-05 there is improvement in profit. The profit index increased from 1.62 in 2002-03 to 1.89 and 2.33 in more recent years (see figure r). The improvement in profitability is because of higher productivity (see figure s), higher relative output prices, and a fall in the capital cost index.

The increase in productivity can be partly explained by two main factors. First, the tendency of over capitalisation detailed in an earlier report (Kompas and Che 2007) seems to have been partially resolved, undoubtedly because of a number of ‘highly expensive’ vessels leaving the fishery. Average vessel capital decreased from about $1.5 million in 2002-03 to $1.3 million, and $1.1 million in 2003-04 and 2004-05. In terms of fishing power (measured as number of hooks), the average hooks per vessel also decreased from about 120 000 hooks in 2002-03 to about 110 000 hooks per boat in 2004-05. Also, the number of operating boats decreased from 150 in 2002-03 to 116 in 2004-05. Typically, those vessels that exit a fishery are the least productive, leaving on average higher efficiency vessels operating in the fishery.

Along with the higher productivity in 2004-05, the higher profit index in 2004-05 can also be explained by lower fishing costs (number of hooks per vessel had decreased), and higher output price index. In addition, it is argued that the increase in the albacore catch also added to profits, especially in 2004-05 (Kompas 2008). In the sample, the catch of albacore increased by roughly 50 per cent from 2003 to 2005 (or from an average 4.8 tonnes to almost 7.0 tonnes per vessel). The average contribution of albacore to GVP per vessel increased to more than A$9000 in 2004-05.

Compared with the period 1998-99, in 2004-05 the output price index had increased, indicating that the relative contribution of the output price to profit has increased. The increase of the output prices and the profit in 2004-05 is because of higher share of harvest in yellowfin and bigeye tuna, with higher values (higher fish prices) in total GVP. The changes in fuel and labour price indexes are negligible (see table 12).

Though this study only covers the period to 2004-05, it is likely that 2005-06 profit may be lower than over the period 2000-01 to 2004-05, because of the decrease in share of high value catch (yellowfin and bigeye). Overall, there appears to be little trend in productivity, a characteristic of ‘limited open access’ fisheries.
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12 Decomposition of Profit Ratios in the longline eastern tuna and billfish fishery
indexes
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profit
productivity
output
fuel
labor
capital
stock
price
price
price
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Obs
R
PO
PF
PL
K
S
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1989-90
22
0.8
1.14
0.95
0.95
0.96
0.18
2.18
1990-91
25
0.85
1.07
0.92
0.95
0.97
0.28
1.45
1991-92
32
0.47
0.74
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.32
1.49
1992-93
34
0.69
1
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.35
1.53
1993-94
27
1
1.21
0.9
0.96
0.98
0.48
1.21
1994-95
33
1.03
1.06
1.06
0.99
0.99
0.54
1.21
1995-96
25
0.75
0.87
1.16
1
0.99
0.5
1.31
1996-97
27
1.13
1.07
1.15
1.02
0.99
0.56
1.25
1997-98
20
1.44
1
1.17
0.97
1
0.84
1.14
1998-99
32
2.14
1.57
1
1
1
1
1
1999-2000
25
2.13
1.36
1.2
1.17
1
0.96
0.95
2000-01
37
2.31
1.24
1.32
1.16
1
1.17
0.99
2001-02
42
2.72
1.2
1.34
1.16
1.01
1.18
1.21
2002-03
31
1.62
0.8
1.09
1.18
1.01
1.15
1.13
2003-04
16
1.89
0.99
0.79
1.19
1.01
1.04
1.13
2004-05
20
2.33
1.2
1.3
1.14
1.01
1.06
1.13
Note: The geometric mean is used to average over the indexes. The results for 1989-90 to 2002-03 are extracted from Kompas and Che (2007). All value are in 2004-05 prices.